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A Social Worker Qualifies as a Criminal Justice
Expert for the Purposes of Classifying a Sex
Offender as a Sexually Violent Predator:
Commonwealth v. Conklin
MENTAL HEALTH - EVIDENCE - EXPERT TESTIMONY - To carry
its burden of proving that a sex offender is a sexually violent
predator, the Commonwealth need not provide a clinical diagnosis
by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist; the opinion of a quali-
fied criminal justice expert suffices.
Commonwealth v. Conklin, 897 A.2d 1168 (Pa. 2006).
Appellant, Donald Robert Conklin, was accused of sexually
abusing his daughter for a period of nearly three years. 1 Conklin
was found guilty in the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas of
various offenses in connection with the abuse after his daughter
testified that he began assaulting her when she was six years old
and that his assaults included acts of forced intercourse. 2 There-
after, the Commonwealth determined that Conklin qualified as a
sexually violent predator (SVP) subject to provisions contained in
Megan's Law II. 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted
Conklin's petition for review to ascertain whether the Common-
wealth had carried its burden of introducing the testimony of a
"licensed psychiatrist, psychologist or criminal justice expert"
when it offered the testimony of a social worker. 4
In March 2002, Conklin's daughter informed her mother that
Conklin had been sexually abusing her for approximately three
years. 5 Subsequently, Conklin was arrested and charged with a
number of sexual offenses. 6 At trial, a jury convicted Conklin of
1. Commonwealth v. Conklin, 897 A.2d 1168, 1169 (Pa. 2006).
2. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1169.
3. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9791-9799.5 (2000).
4. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1169. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.3(a).
5. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1169. Conklin had separated from his ex-wife in January
2001; the couple divorced in September 2001. Id.
6. Id.
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numerous charges relating to the sexual abuse of his daughter.
7
As a result, Conklin was required by Megan's Law 118 to undergo
an evaluation by the State Sexual Offender Assessment Board
(the "Board") to determine whether he was a sexually violent
predator. 9
The assessment was completed by a licensed clinical social
worker, David Humphreys, who was also a member of the Board. 10
With his findings, Humphreys determined that Conklin's mental
condition increased the likelihood of recidivism." Following Hum-
phreys' assessment, the trial court conducted an SVP hearing, at
which Humphreys proffered expert testimony for the state. 12 Af-
ter considering Humphreys' testimony, the trial court concluded
that Conklin should be classified as an SVP. 13
7. Id. at 1169-70. Specifically, the trial court convicted Conklin of rape, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, incest, indecent assault, indecent
exposure and corruption of a minor. Id.
8. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9792. Specifically, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. section 9792 defines a
"sexually violent predator" as: "[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense . . . and who is determined to be a sexually violent predator . . . due to a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory
sexually violent offenses." Id.
9. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1170. If determined to be an SVP, Conklin would be subject
to additional measures. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9795.1-9795.2. Title 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. section 9795.1 provides for two general classes of civil penalty: for lesser sexual of-
fenses, offenders are subject to ten-year registration; for more egregious sexual offenses,
offenders are subject to lifetime registration. Id. § 9795.1. Section 9795.2 provides that,
upon release from incarceration or parole from incarceration, a sex offender designated as
an SVP is required to register with the State Police. Id. § 9795.2.
10. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1170. Humphreys reviewed Conklin's records, conducted an
interview with him, referenced the applicable statutory criteria for SVP designation, and
reasoned that Conklin's behavior indicated that he suffered from a "form of pedophilia" and
an anti-social personality disorder. Id. Specifically, Humphreys determined that Conklin
suffered from an apparent congenital or acquired "mental abnormality," which affected his
"emotional and volitional capacity . . . in a manner that predispose[d] [Conklin] to the
commission of criminal sexual acts to the degree that [made Conklin] a menace to the
health and safety of other persons." Id. In addition, Humphreys noted that, although he
had limited his pedophilic behavior to incest, Conklin had exacerbated both conditions with
alcoholism. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. As indicia of his qualifications, Humphreys submitted that he had attained
Bachelor's degrees in psychology and sociology, as well as a Master's degree in social work;
he belonged to the State Sexual Offender Assessment Board since 1997; he had worked as a
social worker for seventeen years, focusing his work on sex offenders; and he had directed
the sex offender program at a local mental health agency. Id. Also, and possibly most
importantly, Humphreys possessed significant experience providing expert testimony in
SVP classification hearings - nearly twelve to twenty per year - as he had done so not
only for county agencies, but also for county, state and federal probation and parole sys-
tems. Id. at 1170-71.
13. Id. at 1171. The court credited Humphreys' seventeen years of experience working
with sex offenders as expertise enough to qualify him as a criminal justice expert. Id.
Commonwealth v. Conklin
Conklin appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, challeng-
ing Humphreys' qualifications as an expert.14 In an unpublished
decision, the superior court affirmed both the Board and the trial
court's determination that Conklin was an SVP.15 The superior
court predicated its decision that Humphreys was qualified to per-
form SVP assessments and to testify to that effect on the undis-
puted fact that Humphreys was a criminal justice expert. 16
Conklin then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, re-
prising his argument that only licensed psychiatrists or psycholo-
gists qualify to provide expert testimony as to mental abnormali-
ties or personality disorders. 17 Arguing that the terms "mental
abnormality" and "personality disorder" constituted psychological
terms of art, Conklin theorized that such terms could be used only
by those parties licensed to practice psychiatry or psychology. 
1 8
Responding to Conklin's contentions, the supreme court exam-
ined the qualifications of experts in the context of sexually violent
crime. 19 Specifically, the court questioned whether, in order to
prove that a sex offender is an SVP, the Commonwealth must pro-
vide a clinical diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist,
or whether the opinion of a qualified criminal justice expert suf-
fices. 20 Unmoved by Conklin's position, the court held that the
opinion of a qualified criminal justice expert suffices to prove that
a sex offender is an SVP and that the Commonwealth need not
14. Id. Conklin contended that the Commonwealth had failed to meet its burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that he was an SVP because Humphreys was
not qualified to testify as to Conklin's mental condition. Id. See Commonwealth v. Conk-
lin, 806 A.2d 458 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (affirming, without particularizing its reasoning, the
trial court's determination that Conklin was an SVP).
15. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1171. The superior court noted that section 9799.3(a) of
Megan's Law II, which structured Board membership, informed its decision. Id. Section
9799.3(a) provides:
(a) Composition.-The State Sexual Assessment Board shall be composed of
psychiatrists, psychologists and criminal justice experts, each of whom is an ex-
pert in the fields of the behavior and treatment of sexual offenders.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.3(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
16. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1171. Specifically, Humphreys' vast experience working with
sex offenders persuaded the superior court majority that the admission of Humphreys'
testimony complied with Megan's Law II. Id.
17. Id. at 1172. Conklin again argued that a social worker, who was not licensed as a
psychiatrist or psychologist, did not qualify as an expert to testify for the purposes of SVP
assessment. Id.
18. Id. Conklin suggested that the Commonwealth had failed to meet its evidentiary
burden because it had not offered such qualified testimony. Id.
19. Id. at 1169. See also Commonwealth v. Conklin, 867 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2005) (granting
Conklin's Petition for Allowance of Appeal).
20. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1172.
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provide a clinical diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist or psycholo-
gist.2
1
Justice Castille, who authored the majority opinion, incorpo-
rated the tenets of statutory construction in reaching his conclu-
sions. 22 Justice Castille determined that, under the Statutory
Construction Act, 23 the aim of interpreting and construing stat-
utes is to understand and to carry out the stated purpose underly-
ing the legislation. 24 By first examining the statutory language of
Megan's Law II, the court recognized that its review involved the
relationship between two sections of Megan's Law 11.25 First, the
court examined section 9795.4(b), 26 which details SVP assess-
ments and provides that the Board is to develop criteria for and
administer SVP assessments. 27 Then, the court reviewed section
9799.3,28 which articulates the structure, term of service, and rate
of pay for the Board. 29
21. Id. at 1178.
22. Id. at 1175. The court noted that a statute's plain language generally provides the
clearest indication of legislative intent. Id. at 1174-75 (citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gil-
mour Mfg. Co., 822 A.2d 676 (Pa. 2003); Bowser v. Blom, 807 A.2d 830 (Pa. 2002)). Addi-
tionally, the court recognized that extrinsic considerations will be made only where the
statutory language is not explicit. Id. at 1175 (citing, e.g., 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(b)
(1995); Canvass of Absentee Ballots of November 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 1223 (Pa.
2004)). Further, Justice Castille recalled that the determination of whether a witness
qualifies to testify as an expert generally belongs to the discretion of the trial judge. Id. at
1174. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 810 A.2d 1257, 1267 (Pa. 2002). Cumula-
tively, the majority emphasized that the trial court's interpretation of Megan's Law II was
germane to the issue at hand. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1174-75.
23. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (1995). Section 1501 of the Statutory Construction Act
recognizes that, when construing a statute, the general rules of statutory construction
apply; such general rules appear at 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921 (1995). Id. Expounding upon
the rules of statutory construction, section 1921(a) of that title provides: "[tlhe object of all
interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of
the General Assembly." 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(a). The "General Assembly" is "the name
of the legislative body in many states." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 704 (8th ed. 2004).
24. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1175. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1501, 1921(a).
25. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1175.
26. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(b) (2000). Section 9795.4(b) provides:
(b) Assessment.-Upon receipt from the court of an order for an assessment, a
member of the board as designated by the administrative officer of the board
shall conduct an assessment of the individual to determine if the individual
should be classified as a sexually violent predator. The board shall establish
standards for evaluations and for evaluators conducting the assessments.
Id.
27. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1175.
28. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.3 (2000). Section 9799.3 provides:
(a) Composition.-The State Sexual Offenders Assessment Board shall be
composed of psychiatrists, psychologists and criminal justice experts, each of
whom is an expert in the field of the behavior and treatment of sexual offend-
ers.
(b) Appointment.-The Governor shall appoint the board members.
(c) Term of office.--Members of the board shall serve four-year terms.
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First considering section 9795.4(b), Justice Castille reasoned
that Megan's Law II authorized all Board members to conduct
SVP assessments.30 Additionally, Justice Castille determined
that the statute established specific factors to be considered when
conducting an SVP assessment. 31 Then, looking to section 9733.3,
Justice Castille observed that Megan's Law II failed to provide a
definition of the term "criminal justice expert."32  Accordingly,
Justice Castille argued that the explicit language of Megan's Law
II did not demand the expert opinions to come from psychiatrists
or psychologists. 33 In other words, Justice Castille identified noth-
ing in the statute that would delineate Board members according
to their respective qualifications. 34
Extending the scope of review beyond the plain language of
Megan's Law II, the court analyzed Conklin's contention that sec-
tion 1203 of the Professional Psychology Practice Act 35 barred a
licensed clinical social worker, such as Humphreys, from proffer-
(d) Compensation.--The members of the board shall be compensated at a rate
of $350 per assessment and receive reimbursement for their actual and neces-
sary expenses while performing the business of the board. The chairman shall
receive $500 additional compensation per annum.
(e) Staff.-Support staff for the board shall be provided by the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole.
Id.
29. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1175-76.
30. Id. The pertinent language of the statute provides: "[a] member of the board as
designated by the administrative officer of the board shall conduct an assessment of the
individual to determine if the individual should be classified as a sexually violent predator."
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(b).
31. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1175. The factors, established by the Board pursuant to sec-
tion 9795.4(h), included: the facts of the current offense, the defendant's prior offense his-
tory, and the particular characteristics of the individual. Id. at 1175-76 n.13. See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(b).
32. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1176. The court noted, however, that such failure was incon-
sequential because there was no dispute as to whether Humphreys qualified as a criminal
justice expert. Id. at 1176 n.14. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.3.
33. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1176. Reasoning that the Board's sole function was to perform
SVP assessments, the court opined that it was clear that the Legislature envisioned that all
Board members were qualified to perform SVP assessments. Id. Importantly, the statute
expressly allowed for criminal justice experts to offer such opinions. Id.
34. Id. The court posited that all Board members were to serve the same function. Id.
As a result, a Board member's particular profession did not influence his role. Id.
35. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1203 (1996). Section 1203 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the practice of psychology or to
offer or attempt to do so or to hold himself out to the public by any title or de-
scription of services incorporating the words "psychological," "psychologist" or
"psychology" unless he shall first have obtained a license pursuant to this act.
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ing expert testimony regarding a sex offender's mental health. 36
However, Justice Castille determined that, although section 1203
embodied a general restriction, section 1203(3) of the Professional
Psychology Practice Act 37 qualified that restriction to include so-
cial workers as among those professionals authorized to perform
work of a psychological nature. 38 Bolstering its position, the court
referenced section 1903 of the Social Workers' Practice Act,
39
which required that, before holding oneself out to the public as a
social worker, one must have some expertise in the application of
mental and behavioral theory.
40
Having found that social workers were qualified to offer expert
opinions for SVP assessments, Justice Castille differentiated the
majority's conclusions from the standards established by Frye v.
United States.41 The Frye standard provided that scientific evi-
dence is admissible only if the methodology or scientific principle
36. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1176-77. Scrutinizing section 1203 of the Professional Psy-
chology Practice Act, Justice Castille ascertained that the Act generally barred persons not
licensed to practice psychologically-natured work from doing so. Id. at 1177.
37. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1203(3). Section 1203(3) provides:
(3) Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent qualified members of other
recognized professions, including, but not limited to, clergy, drug and alcohol
abuse counselors, mental health counselors, social workers, marriage counsel-
ors, family counselors, crisis intervention counselors, pastoral counselors, re-
habilitation counselors and psychoanalysts, from doing work of a psychological
nature consistent with the training and the code of ethics of their respective
professions or to prevent volunteers from providing services in crisis or emer-
gency situations.
Id.
38. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1177. See 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1203(3).
39. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903 (1998). Section 1903 provides:
"Practice of clinical social work." Holding oneself out to the public by any title
or description of services incorporating the term 'licensed clinical social
worker" or using any words or symbols indicating or tending to indicate that
one is a licensed clinical social worker and under such description offering to
render or rendering a service in which a special knowledge of social resources,
human personality and capabilities and therapeutic techniques is directed at
helping people to achieve adequate and productive personal, interpersonal and
social adjustments in their individual lives, in their families and in their com-
munity. The term includes person and environment perspectives, systems the-
ory and cognitive/behavioral theory, to the assessment and treatment of psy-
chosocial disability and impairment, including mental and emotional disorders,
developmental disabilities and substance abuse. The term includes the appli-
cation of social work methods and theory. The term includes the practice of so-
cial work plus additional concentrated training and study as defined by the
board by regulation.
Id.
40. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1177. The court recognized that a party practicing clinical
social work encounters a variety of cognitive and behavioral perspectives and theories,
including the assessment and treatment of psychosocial disability and impairment. Id.
41. Id. at 1178. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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upon which an expert's opinion is based has gained general accep-
tance in a particular field of science. 42 Invoking a concern for pub-
lic safety, Justice Castille reiterated principles first introduced in
Commonwealth v. Dengler43 and emphasized that Megan's Law II
was not enacted to create a rigid scientific rubric, but rather, as he
suggested in Dengler, it was enacted to protect society from sexu-
ally violent predators.
44
Ultimately, the majority recognized that social workers were
among the articulated professionals authorized to perform work of
a psychological nature, so long as such work was inherently re-
lated to their expertise. 45 Therefore, the court determined that
the state had carried its evidentiary burden because, by virtue of
his training and experience, Humphreys qualified as a criminal
justice expert not only to the satisfaction of the criteria provided
by Megan's Law II, but also to such an extent as to reconcile
Megan's Law II with the exceptions sanctioned by section 1203(3)
of the Professional Psychology Practice Act.46
In his concurring opinion, Justice Baer revisited fears that he
first expressed in Dengler.47 Although he agreed that social work-
ers experienced working with sex offenders may qualify as experts
to offer testimony regarding a sex offender's SVP status,48 Justice
Baer felt concern that relying on statutory criteria for the admis-
sion of expert testimony usurped the autonomy and discretion of
trial courts. 49
Despite Justice Baer's apprehension, statutes providing for the
commitment of sex offenders who display a propensity for recidi-
vism are common in many states. 50 In 1995, with the approval of
42. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1178. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
43. 890 A.2d 372 (Pa. 2005). Justice Castille also authored the majority decision in
Dengler. Dengler, 890 A.2d at 373.
44. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1178 (citing Dengler, 890 A.2d at 383). In order to achieve
such societal protection, Justice Castille posited that evidence must not be subject to the
standards of admissibility as commonly associated with the mental health paradigm. Id.
(citing Dengler, 890 A.2d at 383).
45. Id. at 1177.
46. Id. at 1178. See supra note 37.
47. Id. (Baer, J., concurring). See Dengler, 890 A.2d at 385-88 (Baer, J., concurring).
48. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1181 (Baer, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 1179. See Dengler, 890 A.2d at 385-88 (Baer, J., concurring). Justice Baer
agreed with the majority that a trial judge possessed the discretion to determine whether a
witness was qualified to testify as an expert. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1179 (Baer, J., concur-
ring). However, he disagreed with the "majority . . . [for] sanction[ing] the legislature's
evisceration of trial court discretion and [replacing] it with the legislature's own standard-
ized criteria...." Id.
50. Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Admissibility of Actuarial Risk Assessment
Testimony in Proceeding to Commit Sex Offender, 2003 A.L.R.5th 13 (2003). 'Many states
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Act Number 1995-24, Pennsylvania enacted such a statute, which
is commonly known as Megan's Law 1.51 In 1999, however, in Wil-
liams I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that the proc-
ess for determining SVP status, as provided by Megan's Law I,
was unconstitutional. 52 Following the invalidation of Megan's
Law I, in 2000, the Pennsylvania General Assembly addressed
and amended the unconstitutional provisions of Megan's Law I,
which resulted in Megan's Law 11.
53
In Commonwealth v. Krouse,54 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
waged the first critical examination of Megan's Law II as it delib-
erated over the evidentiary threshold required to designate a sex
offender as an SVP. 55 Days after Megan's Law II was enacted,
defendant Frank Lee Krouse pleaded guilty to charges of several
sexual offenses after he engaged in oral sex with a ten-year-old
boy. 56 Thereafter, Krouse was ordered to undergo an SVP evalua-
tion. 57 After considering the findings of Board member William
have statutes providing for the civil commitment of those sex offenders who are determined
to be at a high risk for reoffending." Id. at 13. States that have enacted similar statutes
often refer to such persons as "sexually violent predators" or "sexually violent persons." Id.
51. Megan's Law I, Pub. L. No. 1995-24, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9791-9799.5 (2000),
invalidated by Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999) [hereinafter "Williams
I"]. From its inception, Megan's Law I emphasized that the safety of society was among
the chief reasons for its adoption. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9791(b).
52. Williams I, 733 A.2d at 594. Williams I ruled Megan's Law I unconstitutional be-
cause, following his conviction for a predicate offense, a sex offender bore the burden of
rebutting the presumption of SVP status by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 594.
Specifically, the supreme court posited that the presumption of SVP status that accompa-
nied conviction for a predicate offense violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Id. at 603. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides: "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of the law." Id. See Commonwealth v. Halye, 719 A.2d 763, 769 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998) (holding as unconstitutional the provisions of Megan's Law I that required
a sex offender to rebut a presumption instead of imposing the burden of persuasion by clear
and convincing evidence on the prosecution).
53. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9791-9799.5 (2000). Since Megan's Law II was enacted in
2000 with the passage of Act Number 2000-18, the evidentiary principles at issue in Conk-
lin have received limited treatment by the courts: for example, Dengler was a case of first
impression regarding whether an expert's opinion testimony constituted novel scientific
evidence and was, therefore, subject to the tests espoused by Frye. Case Law Develop-
ments, Expert Evidence and Testimony, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 170
(Mar.-Apr. 2006). See also Dengler, 890 A.2d 372; Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923)
54. 799 A.2d 835 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
55. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 836. Although Krouse challenged the constitutionality of vari-
ous aspects of Megan's Law II, the state did not consider the constitutional claims because
the case was resolved on the merits of the sufficiency of evidence. Id. at 837.
56. Id. at 836. At the time of the incident, Krouse had been residing at the boy's home.
Id.
57. Id.
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Allenbaugh and determining his testimony to be credible, the trial
court designated Krouse as an SVP.58
On review, superior court Judge Johnson, author of the majority
opinion, maintained that determining Allenbaugh's testimony to
be credible did not compel the trial court to conclude that Krouse
was an SVP. 59 Cognizant of the societal stigma incident to SVP
designation, Judge Johnson surmised that a fact finder must be
persuaded by clear and convincing evidence before designating a
sex offender as an SVP.60
Aware of the shifted burden of proof effectuated by the adoption
Megan's Law 11,61 Judge Johnson ruled that the Commonwealth
had failed to present clear and convincing evidence establishing
that Krouse was an SVP. 62 To substantiate the majority's posi-
tion, Judge Johnson relied on Ohio v. Eppinger,63 which addressed
a similar Ohio statute. 64 In doing so, Judge Johnson cautioned
that SVP determination should be governed by specific, statuto-
rily-defined factors because very serious societal repercussions
accompany SVP designation.6
5
Although Krouse was disposed of without analyzing the consti-
tutionality of Megan's Law II, the constitutional question did not
stay dormant long.66 In Commonwealth v. Williams ("Williams
1/"),67 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court scrutinized the registra-
58. Id. Despite failing to interview Krouse, Allenbaugh concluded that Krouse quali-
fied as an SVP. Id. The superior court noted that the trial court had determined Krouse to
be an SVP without incorporating the factors provided by section 9795.4(b) and without
providing findings to the satisfaction of the necessary elements of an SVP as provided by
section 9792. Id. In other words, relying almost exclusively on the testimony of Al-
lenbaugh, the trial court had formulated legal conclusions without substantiating its con-
clusions with specific facts. Id. at 838.
59. Id. at 840.
60. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 840. Clear and convincing evidence is "[elvidence indicating
that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 2004). Allenbaugh concluded that Krouse was an SVP because,
among other things, Krouse had displayed predatory behavior around persons he had be-
friended. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 840. Allenbaugh interpreted such behavior to be "grooming
behavior." Id. In addition, Allenbaugh found that Krouse tended to be sexually aroused by
males. Id. Allenbaugh relied on several published studies that suggested that men given
to such behavior are likely to repeat sexually abusive activity. Id.
61. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 839. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(e)(3).
62. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 842. As a result, the court reversed the designation of Krouse
as an SVP. Id. However, the court noted that its decision did not reverse Krouse's predi-
cate conviction of indecent assault. Id.
63. 743 N.E.2d 881, 888-89 (Oh. 2001) (establishing standards of appellate review for
SVP determination).
64. Krouse, 799 A.2d at 843.
65. Id. (citing Eppinger, 743 N.E.2d at 888-89).
66. Id.
67. 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003).
138 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 45
tion, notification, and counseling provisions of the act to determine
whether the act constituted punishment without due process of
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
68
Williams II involved the consolidated appeals of Gomer Wil-
liams and Bruce Peters, who had each filed a Motion for Extraor-
dinary Relief69 after being convicted of SVP predicate offenses.
70
Both Williams and Peters were granted such relief as their respec-
tive trial courts ruled that the registration, notification, and coun-
seling provisions of Megan's Law II stood on infirm constitutional
grounds. 71 On review, Justice Saylor, who authored the majority
opinion, referred to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey.72  Applying Apprendi, he inferred that
Megan's Law II would fail if its provisions constituted punish-
ment, because an SVP determination required only clear and con-
vincing evidence, which is a lesser evidentiary threshold than the
Apprendi reasonable doubt standard. 73
Employing a two-tiered analysis, Justice Saylor examined the
legislative intent of the law and the factors enunciated in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez74 to determine the constitutionality of
68. Williams II, 832 A.2d at 964. See supra note 52.
69. A 'Motion for Extraordinary Relief' seeks relief from a judgment or order, and
authorizes the granting of relief from final judgments for "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of judgment." 35B C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 1263 (2006). See
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). To obtain such relief, the moving party must convince the court
that a valid reason exists to justify awarding such relief. Id.
70. Williams II, 832 A.2d at 965. Each man argued that the registration, notification,
and counseling provisions of Megan's Law II violated the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions. Id. SVP predicate offenses include: kidnapping, institutional sexual as-
sault, indecent assault, incest, prostitution, child molestation, sexual exploitation of chil-
dren, unlawful contact with minors, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault,
aggravated sexual assault, and rape. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.1 (2000).
71. Williams II, 832 A.2d at 965. Subsequently, the Commonwealth appealed, chal-
lenging the trial court's conclusion that the disputed provisions of Megan's Law II were
unconstitutional. Id.
72. 530 U.S. 466, 488-92 (2000) (holding that any judicial decision resulting in punish-
ment must first be submitted to a jury and must satisfy the reasonable doubt evidentiary
threshold).
73. Williams II, 832 A.2d at 968. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488-92.
74. 372 U.S. 144, 167-70 (1963). Justice Saylor stated:
The Mendoza-Martinez Court identified the following considerations: (1)
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether
it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behav-
ior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it ap-
pears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Williams II, 832 A.2d at 973 (citing Mendoza.Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
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Megan's Law II.75 First, Justice Saylor determined that, gener-
ally, Megan's Law II did not endeavor to punish. 76 Next, Justice
Saylor analyzed the registration, notification, and counseling pro-
visions of Megan's Law II through the Mendoza-Martinez lens,
finding that Megan's Law II neither pursued a punitive purpose
nor produced a punitive effect.
77
Ultimately, the Williams H court upheld the registration, notifi-
cation, and counseling provisions of Megan's Law II as constitu-
tional;78 however, in Commonwealth v. Haughwout,79 the issue
was revisited.80 In Haughwout, the superior court relied upon the
decision reached in Williams H to reject appellant Haughwout's
argument that the registration, notification, and counseling provi-
sions of Megan's Law II were so harsh as to constitute punish-
75. Williams II, 832 A.2d at 971-73.
76. Id. at 972 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9791(b)). Megan's Law II explicitly provides:
(b) Declaration of policy.--It is hereby declared to be the intention of the Gen-
eral Assembly to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this
Commonwealth by providing for registration and community notification re-
garding sexually violent predators who are about to be released from custody
and will live in or near their neighborhood. It is further declared to be the pol-
icy of this Commonwealth to require the exchange of relevant information
about sexually violent predators among public agencies and officials and to au-
thorize the release of necessary and relevant information about sexually violent
predators to members of the general public as a means of assuring public pro-
tection and shall not be construed as punitive.
Id. (emphasis added). Specifically, the court recognized that "the legislature's intent in
requiring offenders to register with the State Police regarding their whereabouts was not
retribution." Williams II, 832 A.2d at 972. Concomitantly, the court found that requiring
convicted sex offenders to register, notify, and receive counseling served an important pub-
lic safety function in a non-punitive and remedial fashion. Id. (citing Commonwealth v.
Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 619 (Pa. 1999)). "Remedial" means "affording or providing a rem-
edy; providing the means of obtaining redress." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1319 (8th ed.
2004).
77. Williams II, 832 A.2d at 972-85. The Williams H court: (1) determined that
Megan's Law Il did not involve affirmative disability or restraint; (2) recognized that the
law had not traditionally been regarded as punishment; (3) articulated that the law did not
operate upon a finding of scienter alone; (4) noted that the law did not endeavor to deter
blameworthy conduct; (5) stated that the law was triggered only upon the finding of a men-
tal abnormality or personality disorder rather than criminal behavior; (6) found that the
law was rationally connected to a non-punitive purpose; (7) recognized that the law was
reasonably structured to serve the government's legitimate goal of promoting public aware-
ness and preventing sex offender recidivism. Id. at 974-75, 977-79, 982-83.
78. Id. at 964-65.
79. 837 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). Appellant Guy Haughwout postured his consti-
tutional challenge upon his procedural and substantive due process rights. Haughwout,
837 A.2d at 489.
80. Id. at 484. Haughwout argued that the registration, notification, and counseling
provisions of Megan's Law II constituted criminal punishment and thereby violated his
procedural due process rights because the provisions did not provide him with the opportu-
nity for future assessment of his SVP status. Id. at 486.
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ment.81 Reiterating Williams II, the Haughwout court affirmed
the constitutionality of Megan's Law J1.82
Shortly after Williams II and Haughwout firmly established the
constitutionality of Megan's Law II, the superior court decided
Commonwealth v. Malseed.8 3 There, the court was asked to inves-
tigate the extent of a trial court's discretion when determining
whether a witness is qualified as an expert for the purposes of an
SVP assessment.8 4 While reviewing the case of Leroy Malseed,
the court held that reversing a trial court's finding that a party
qualified as a witness is appropriate only upon a determination
that the trial judge had abused his discretion.8 5 Distilling the
scope of expert witness qualification, Malseed pronounced that to
qualify as an expert witness one must be more knowledgeable
than the average person with regard to a particular topic. 8 6 Addi-
tionally, Malseed maintained that one need not have received for-
mal education on the subject matter to offer expert testimony
when one's expertise is derived from training and experience.8 7
81. Id. at 488. Although Haughwout's initial challenge to his designation as an SVP
involved raising a sufficiency claim, the superior court panel concluded that the record
indicated that the evidence against Haughwout clearly and convincingly supported the trial
court's determination that Haughwout was an SVP. Id. at 486. Board member David
Humphreys, who offered expert testimony in Commonwealth v. Conklin, acted as the
state's expert witness in Haughwout and found that Haughwout's sexually offensive behav-
ior involved multiple victims and was compounded by substance abuse. Id. at 485-86.
82. Id. at 489. Addressing Haughwout's procedural due process rights, the superior
court deferred to the Board, which had found that Haughwout posed a very real threat of
recidivism. Id. In effect, the superior court panel deferred to the Legislature, which cited
recidivism, as well as public safety, as substantial grounds for the validity of the Act. Id.
Addressing Haughwout's substantive due process rights, the court found that because the
challenged provisions of Megan's Law II did not subject him to extended or unwarranted
confinement, the challenged provisions were not unconstitutional. Id. The court upheld
Haughwout's designation as an SVP because the Commonwealth had clearly and convinc-
ingly established him as a threat to act again and because Haughwout had failed to estab-
lish the constitutional invalidity of Megan's Law II. Haughwout, 837 A.2d at 490. The
court noted that, because Haughwout had failed to offer rebuttal evidence of an alternative
successful treatment of SVPs, the statute's presumed constitutionality remained unim-
peached. Id. at 489. See Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143, 147 (Pa. 2001) (recogniz-
ing that the party seeking to surmount the statute's presumption of validity must satisfy a
formidable burden).
83. 847 A.2d 112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
84. Malseed, 847 A.2d at 113.
85. Id. at 115. See Commonwealth v. Serge, 837 A.2d 1255 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
86. Malseed, 847 A.2d at 114 (citing Serge, 837 A.2d at 1260). Specifically, Malseed
recognized that one must be possessed of "any reasonable pretension to specialized knowl-
edge on the subject under investigation." Id. (citing Serge, 837 A.2d at 1260).
87. Id. (citing Serge, 837 A.2d at 1260). Utilizing the criteria that it espoused, the court
recognized that Board member Nancy Eisnel, who had offered expert testimony as to Mal-
seed's SVP status, qualified as an expert to testify in an SVP evaluation because she had
attained a Master's degree in counseling and had performed over sixty SVP assessments
during her time as a Board member. Id.
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As the Malseed court preserved trial court discretion and ren-
dered a superficial delineation of the contours of expert witness
qualification, Commonwealth v. Dengler88 probed deeper into the
nuances of expert witness qualification, establishing that a trial
court possessed the authority to exercise its discretion to deter-
mine whether a witness qualified as an expert, and that such dis-
cretion is sound unless abused or arbitrarily used.8 9 In Dengler,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether the evi-
dentiary screening test developed by Frye90 applied to a psycholo-
gist's expert testimony in the context of the statutory criteria for
classification as an SVP.91
Board member and clinical psychologist, Dr. Veronique Valliere,
performed the assessment, concluding that defendant Harry
Dengler satisfied the statutory criteria for SVP classification, and
later offered expert testimony at his SVP hearing to that effect.
92
While Dengler conceded that Dr. Valliere qualified as an expert,
he argued that her opinion was inadmissible because of the requi-
sites provided by the Frye test.93 The trial court disagreed, admit-
ting Valliere's testimony into evidence.
94
The supreme court subsequently reviewed the application of the
Frye standard to determine when scientific evidence may properly
be deemed inadmissible as based on new or novel methods.
95
88. 890 A.2d 372 (Pa. 2005). See Commonwealth v. Dengler, 843 A.2d 1241 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004).
89. Dengler, 890 A.2d at 382-83.
90. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
91. Dengler, 890 A.2d at 373. After finding him guilty of two predicate offenses -
aggravated indecent assault and corruption of minors - the trial court ordered an evalua-
tion of defendant Harry Dengler to determine his SVP status. Id. at 374.
92. Id. at 375. In her assessment, Dr. Valliere noted that she had attempted to inter-
view Dengler but that he refused to cooperate. Id. As a result, Dr. Valliere referenced
court records, the probable cause affidavit and two prior sexual assaults that Dengler had
committed against minors. Id. at 375. Dr. Valliere emphasized that Dengler had a history
of recidivism and that his behavior displayed a distorted world perspective, in which he
routinely interpreted his victims' behavior to suggest that they were sexually interested in
him. Id. at 375-76.
93. Id. at 377.
94. Id. at 378. Dengler then appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, arguing
that, according to the Frye standard, Dr. Valliere's testimony should have been inadmissi-
ble because her conclusions implicated novel scientific concepts. Id. at 378-79. See Dengler,
843 A.2d 1241. The superior court panel majority rejected Dengler's argument and con-
cluded that Dr. Valliere's methodologies were not novel. Dengler, 890 A.2d at 379. See
Dengler, 843 A.2d 1241.
95. Dengler, 890 A.2d at 379. Justice Castille, who authored the majority opinion,
emphasized that an appellate court is limited to determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion when reviewing a trial court's evidentiary ruling - even when such a
ruling implicates the Frye standard. Id. See, e.g., Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038,
1046 (Pa. 2003); Zeiber v. Bogert, 773 A.2d 758, 760 n.3 (Pa. 2003).
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Dengler attacked the trial court's determination that Dr. Valliere's
testimony did not use novel scientific principles and, therefore,
satisfied the Frye standard.96 Concomitantly, he challenged the
statutory construction of Megan's Law II, arguing that the stat-
ute's failure to define a normal personality type handicapped an
assessor by failing to provide an objective point of reference for
SVP determination. 97
. Importantly, Justice Castille noted that scientific evidence did
not automatically implicate the Frye analysis. 98 Bearing that in
mind, Justice Castille refused to apply Frye in the context of SVP
assessments, as he concluded that a sex offender's status as an
SVP was a statutory question rather than a matter of pure or
novel science.99 As a result, Justice Castille was satisfied that Dr.
Valliere's testimony comported with the standards governing SVP
assessment as established by Megan's Law 11. 100
In a concurring opinion, Justice Baer expressed skepticism that
the statutory factors, which defined the scope of scientific inquiry,
were conclusive as to whether such evidence implicated the Frye
analysis. 10 1 Nonetheless, Justice Baer concurred because he was
satisfied that the admissibility of such evidence was to be deter-
mined exclusively by trial court discretion, and here found no
abuse. 102
96. Dengler, 890 A.2d at 379. Dengler argued that Dr. Valliere's reliance on records,
rather than conducting a personal assessment, was not standard psychological or psychiat-
ric procedure. Id. Justice Castille rejected Dengler's contention that Dr. Valliere's method-
ologies were insufficient because, in fact, Dengler had refused to be interviewed. Id. at 380.
Further, Dengler waged the general argument that predictions concerning recidivism are
notoriously unreliable. Id. at 379.
97. Id. at 379-80. Justice Castille noted that the statutory construct, by which SVP
assessments were to be conducted, did not constitute a diagnostic function for treatment
purposes; rather, the statute was designed to trigger a legal response that protected society
from sex offender recidivism. Id. at 380.
98. Id. at 382. Supporting his position, Justice Castille acknowledged that the deter-
mination of whether evidence constituted novel scientific evidence had generally been de-
cided on a case-by-case basis. Id. See Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 859 A.2d 1254, 1260
(Pa. 2004) (recognizing that the application of the Frye test should be limited and deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis).
99. Dengler, 890 A.2d at 383. Justice Castille found that the science implicated by an
SVP assessment was derivative of a legislative scheme that established specific elements
for not only SVP assessment, but also for Board membership and SVP status. Id. Because
Dr. Valliere's testimony did not rely upon any actuarial tests, the court upheld the admissi-
bility of her testimony and rejected Dengler's argument that the admissibility of her testi-
mony was subject to the Frye standard. Id. at 385.
100. Id. Justice Castille refrained from upsetting the specific statutory construct of
Megan's Law II because the law established clear statutory criteria for SVP assessment.
Id.
101. Id. at 385 (Baer, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 385, 388.
Commonwealth v. Conklin
Throughout the lineage of cases involving Megan's Law II, the
endeavor to articulate and refine the evidentiary principles re-
quired to designate a sex offender as an SVP has persisted. First,
Megan's Law I was found to be unconstitutional because, under
that statute, the defendant bore the burden of rebutting the pre-
sumption of SVP status by clear and convincing evidence. 03 The
adoption of Megan's Law II shifted the burden of proof to the Com-
monwealth. 10 4 Thereafter, Krouse established clear and convinc-
ing evidence as the evidentiary threshold required for SVP desig-
nation. 10 5 Then, Williams II and Haughwout affirmed the consti-
tutionality of the registration, notification, and counseling provi-
sions of Megan's Law II, finding that the provisions did not consti-
tute punishment. 0 6 Next, Malseed not only preserved trial court
discretion, but also defined expert witness qualification. 10 7 Fi-
nally, Dengler deferred to a carefully planned statutory construct
and refused to apply the Frye standard to SVP testimony proffered
by a Board member.1
0 8
Arguably, the deference given to trial court discretion repre-
sents the most compelling issue pervading the Conklin line of
cases. The Conklin court understood the issue as the interplay
between trial court discretion and the specific statutory criteria
provided by Megan's Law II.109 Interestingly, Justice Castille fo-
cused primarily upon the interpretation and construction of
Megan's Law II while paying minimal attention to the well-
established standard that a witness' status as an expert was a
matter to be determined by the trial court. 110 Simply, the Conklin
court seemed unrelentingly devoted to the specific statutory lan-
guage of Megan's Law II. However, despite devoting much of its
attention to the statutory interpretation and construction of
Megan's Law II, the Conklin majority emphasized that its holding
neither limited nor eliminated trial court discretion. 111
In his concurrence, Justice Baer raised an interesting hypo-
thetical when he expressed his fear that the majority's holding,
103. Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 594 (Pa. 1999). See also supra note 52.
104. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9791-9799.5 (2000).
105. Commonwealth v. Krouse, 799 A.2d 835, 842 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
106. Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 972-83 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v.
Haughwout, 837 A.2d 480, 488 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
107. Commonwealth v. Malseed, 847 A.2d 112, 114-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
108. Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 379-80, 385 (Pa. 2005) (majority opinion).
109. Commonwealth v. Conklin, 897 A.2d 1168, 1174-76 (Pa. 2006). See also Conklin,
897 A.2d at 1180-81 (Baer, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1174-75 (majority opinion).
111. Id. at 1178 n.17.
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which seemingly prioritized the statutory criteria of Megan's Law
II over trial court discretion, may create a problematic situation
when an individual who attains Board membership otherwise
lacks the sophistication to proffer expert testimony for the pur-
poses of an SVP evaluation. 112 In response, Justice Castille ana-
lyzed Justice Baer's hypothetical and decreed that trial court dis-
cretion remained intact, as trial courts retained the authority to
sustain an objection to the admissibility of evidence proffered by
an otherwise qualified SVP expert. 
113
While the Conklin court facially attempted to assuage Justice
Baer's fears, it cannot be overlooked that the Conklin opinion
seems to revere the statutory construct of Megan's Law II over
trial judge discretion when determining a witness' status as an
expert. In short, Justice Baer's concern was legitimate. Although
Justice Castille appeared to value the importance of trial court
discretion when he noted that "the ultimate determination of SVP
status is made by the trial judge, who is not obliged to accept the
SVP evaluator's expert opinion," 114 a direct conflict between the
statutory construct of Megan's Law II and trial court discretion
seems inevitable.
Certainly, Conklin contributes to the articulation and refine-
ment of evidentiary principles with regard to Megan's Law II.
However, perhaps it remains most critical to maintain perspective
when confronting the intricacies of this statute. Consistent with
the law's stated purpose, 115 Megan's Law II was enacted to effec-
tuate the protection of society and, more importantly, though not
expressly provided, to ensure the safety of society's children.
Whether it is a statutory rubric or trial court determination that
establishes the qualifications of a witness as an expert, it is criti-
cal to bear in mind that, in these cases, courts are dealing with sex
offenders who pose a legitimate threat of recidivism. The Conklin
trial court recognized this principle when it explained that its de-
termination of Conklin's SVP status had been reached almost
without consideration of Humphreys' testimony because the facts
were undeniable: Conklin had sexually abused his daughter for
nearly three years. 116
112. Id. at 1180-81 (Baer, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 1178 n.17 (majority opinion).
114. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1178 n.17.
115. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9792 (2000).
116. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1171.
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Certainly, society's interest in convicting offenders for predicate
sexual offenses does not vitiate the need for fairness or constitu-
tional safeguards. However, it remains critical that, when one's
conduct implicates society's need for protection, the system must
be liberally construed to facilitate such protection. As the Dengler
court noted, Megan's Law II does not demand evaluation for
treatment purposes; rather, it triggers a legal response that pro-
tects society from threats posed by sex offender recidivism. 117
In Conklin, Justice Castille argued that to achieve societal pro-
tection in the context of sexually violent crime, evidence must not
be subject to the standards of admissibility commonly associated
with the ordinary health paradigm. 118 Certainly, sex offender re-
cidivism poses a very dangerous threat to the health and stability
of society. Carefully drafted and nuanced, Megan's Law II repre-
sents the mechanism by which society ensures its safety and
through which society's conscience is expressed.
Jarrod T. Takah
117. Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 380 (Pa. 2005).
118. Conklin, 897 A.2d at 1178 (citing Dengler, 890 A.2d at 383).
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